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Abstract. This paper suggests the use of the choice experiment approach to inform 
the design of a payment for environmental services (PES) to foster collective 
rangeland management. The empirical implementation was conducted in the M’goun 
watershed located in South-East of Morocco. Individual acceptability of various 
conservation measures and incentives is analysed. The results show that the 
combination of individual and collective conservation measures under individual 
subscription, and incentives in the form of technical assistance to improve production 
performances are ways that can facilitate the implementation of PES and encourage 
collective action for the conservation of pastures as a common good. 
1 Introduction 
Efficiency and effectiveness of natural resources conservation policies in 
developed or developing countries largely depends on their acceptability by 
the people who directly use these resources or affect their condition through 
their activities. Thus, in many countries, past and present soil and water 
conservation policies, of « command & control » type, have met with   the 
resistance of rural populations who directly derive substantial benefits from 
the exploitation of resources targeted by preservation measures, or from the 
activities which contribute to degrade them. Moreover, the weakness of 
natural resources governing institutions often makes difficult the control over 
uses and practices and the respect of regulations (Baland and Platteau, 1996). 
From the beginning of 2000’s, payments for environmental services (PES) 
have emerged as innovative instruments for environment conservation policy. 
Indeed, they allow translating non market values of ecosystems into financial 
incentives for local stakeholders who produce these services, thus increasing 
the acceptability of conservation policies. PES are voluntary agreements, 
under which direct beneficiaries of environmental services are willing to pay  
(incentive) the service suppliers, under the conditionality of effective service 
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delivery. PES have been especially implemented for watershed protection to 
reduce erosion, regulate water flows, enhance groundwater recharge, mitigate 
floods and improve water quality (sometimes at the instigation of 
international funding agencies, such as the World Bank) (FAO, 2004 ; Smith 
et al., 2006; Bennett et al., 2013). 
The increasing interest arisen by this type of instrument can be explained 
by the possibility to negotiate the contractual terms and the choice of 
conservation measures, the voluntary and free character of the subscription 
and the opportunity to adapt contractual terms and conservation measures to 
the local context  (type of ecosystems and services providers) (Wunder, 2013 ; 
Pirard and Billé, 2010). Moreover, in developing countries, PES may 
contribute to poverty reduction through the provision of additional income to 
vulnerable rural people (Pagiola et al., 2005; Tschakert, 2007; Pagiola et al., 
2008; Wunder, 2008). 
To date, the majority of PES experiences have occurred in a private 
property context. Indeed, potential environmental services providers are 
theoretically those who hold property rights, or at least user rights, on the 
ecosystems generating the services (Engel et al., 2008). Private landholders 
having full rights on their lands can more easily freely subscribe to a PES 
program. In the case of ecosystems under common property, the right-holding 
community, in its whole, can be considered as the environmental service 
provider, but then arise the usual issues of potential heterogeneity of 
individual contributions to service provision  and of payment distribution 
within the community. Thus, the rare documented cases of PES in a common-
property context imply the collective enrolment of private smallholders in 
Costa-Rica (Pagiola, 2008) or the subscription of small communities such as 
the ejidos to the PSA-H National Program in Mexico (Muñoz-Piña et al., 
2008 ; Balderas Torres et al., 2013). In most cases prior organization of 
individuals or communities is deemed necessary to reduce transaction costs 
related to collective PES negotiation, implementation and management 
(Ledant, 2008). These transaction costs can prove to be particularly high in 
the case of large common-property ecosystems, where user rights are shared 
within large groups (Fisher et al., 2010).  
In Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa, the implementation of PES would be 
particularly interesting to improve collective pastures management. Indeed, 
common rangelands occupy very large areas of degraded and fragile lands in 
these regions (le Polain de Waroux and Lambin, 2012). They also play an 
important economic role through incomes from livestock rearing and 
conservation of increasingly rare water resources (MAPM, 2014). The failure 
of standard conservation policies to preserve these ecosystems should be 
noticed and PES, which have not been used and seldom studied so far in this 
part of the world, could be an interesting policy alternative (El Mokaddem et 
al., 2014).  
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In this paper, we propose to explore the possibility and the interest to 
implement PES program targeting individual users of collective goods, 
through the analysis of their preferences for different types of actions: 
participation to a collective action or implementation of individual actions for 
watershed protection. We assume that prior collective organization, 
superimposed on pre-existing institutions, is not necessary for applying a PES 
to a common-pool system, and that the success of such a program depends on 
its acceptation by the relevant populations, as long as its design is adapted to 
individual preferences. 
To do this, we propose to assess ex ante the preferences of targeted rural 
populations, using a choice experiment approach (CE). This method, based on 
the use of a hypothetical market, has largely been used to analyse the 
preferences of ecosystem services beneficiaries and evaluate their willingness 
to pay for their preservation. More recently, it has started to be used to inform 
the design of PES. Indeed, it allows anticipating the acceptance and adapting 
the modalities of new environmental management policies (Hanley et al., 
2001 ; Hensher, 2010). In developed countries, it was applied for the 
improvement of water quality through an adaptation of agricultural practices 
in different production systems (Beharry-Borg et al., 2013 ; Kuhfuss et al., 
2014 ; Christensen et al., 2011 ; Espinosa-Goded et al., 2010), or for 
assessing land management alternatives for watershed conservation (García-
Llorente et al., 2012), or forest protection by farmers (Broch et al., 2013). In 
developing countries, CE has mostly been applied to design PES for forestry 
or agro-forestry systems (see for example Kaczan et al., 2013 ; Cranford and 
Mourato, 2014; Mulatu et al., 2014). Applications of this method to rangeland 
system are rare and relatively recent: Greiner et al., 2014 proposed a 
framework to assess the participation  to rangeland conservation contracts in 
Australia. Tesfaye and Brouwer, 2012 studied the design of measures to 
encourage the adoption of soil conservation practices in Gedeben watershed in 
Ethiopia. In particular, they used the CE approach to identify the key 
institutional and economic conditions underpinning farmers’ PES 
membership.  
The objective of this paper is thus to demonstrate that CE can help framing 
the design of a PES for collective rangelands, through the identification of 
appropriate conservation and incentive measures and the assessment of their 
individual acceptability by the targeted rural populations. The empirical 
application concerns the collective rangelands of M’goun watershed, south-
east of Morocco. Its originality lies in the application of PES in a common-
pool ecosystem. Moreover, it is one of the first applications of the CE 
approach to the design of an incentive-based environmental policy instrument 
in Maghreb. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: The case study is 
described in section 2. Section 3 gives a general presentation of the CE 
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approach and specifies the experimental design, data collection method and 
econometric model specification. Results are presented in section 4 and 
discussed in section 5. The last section is dedicated to the conclusion. 
2 Study site: the M’goun watershed 
The M’goun watershed is located in the south-east of Morocco (Fig. 1) and 
submitted to a semi-arid to arid climate characterized by an annual mean 
rainfall of 130 mm. It belongs to the Oued Draa basin, upstream of the El 
Mansour Eddahbi dam and spreads out over an area of 1240 km² , among 
which 46 290 ha are collective rangelands . 
The watershed rural population (2509 households) derives its main income 
from sheep and goat rearing. The upstream part of the catchment, with steeper 
slopes, corresponds to rangelands, used mainly by the Imgoun tribe, and in 
some places by other migratory neighbouring tribes. The degradation of 
pastures, resulting from drought and an increasing competition between 
livestock breeders, has led to the settlement of numerous migrant breeders. 
These recently settled farmers have taken over and developed collective lands 
in the downstream part of the catchment, where they complement livestock 
breeding with subsistence farming. 
Use and access rules governing collective rangelands were voluntarily 
defined by the tribe several decades ago. All tribe members hold joint and 
inalienable ownership rights on lands.  However, individual appropriation is 
tolerated with the agreement of a tribe representative and of the Ministry of 
Home Affairs. Appropriated lands are rightfully managed as private lands. 
Oued M’goun is the main tributary of Oued Dadès, which supplies El 
Mansour Eddahbi dam. Water abstractions amounting to 30 to 40 million 
cubic meters per year (for an annual volume of 250 Mm3) are shared 
downstream between six irrigated palm oases and the domestic water supply 
to Ouarzazate city and its surrounding area.  
Overexploitation of rangelands and decreasing forest cover, associated with 
the uneven topography  of upstream lands, are leading to an accelerating soil 
erosion and consequently important sediment loads during  flooding periods, 
impairing water quality and dam storage capacity. This is threatening the 
availability and quality of water, while domestic water demand is expected to 
increase, and irrigation water deficit might jeopardize the future of oasis 
farming in the coming years (Choukr-Allah, 2005; Laouina, 2007). 
Consequently, pastoral and agro-pastoral ecosystems’ conservation appears to 
be necessary to reduce and prevent these problems, through an improvement 
of hydrological regulation services. 
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Fig. 1: Location of the M’goun catchment (scale: 1/3000000) and elevation map 
(scale: 1/175000) (Source: CBTHA, 2003) 
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3 Method 
The choice experiment approach chosen for this research, is based on stated 
preferences, and aims at understanding the determinants of individual choices. 
Individuals are placed in a hypothetical choice situation, as close as possible 
to reality where they are asked to compare several alternatives (in this case, 
PES alternatives to improve water quality and availability by way of 
collective rangelands conservation). Each alternative is described with 
attributes, with varying level or intensity, which are assumed to influence 
individual choices (Louviere et al., 2000) and, consequently, the utility 
associated with the attributes by individuals. Alternatives are selected and 
paired according to an experimental design and utility variations are assessed 
using an empirical model specified according to the random utility theory 
(Adamowicz et al., 1998). 
3.1 Experimental design 
The first step in CE consists in choosing the attributes to describe the 
hypothetical PES, and in defining the number and value of attributes’ levels. 
In our case study, the chosen attributes are related to, on one hand, 
conservation measures to improve hydrological regulation of surface water 
(both in terms of quality and availability) and to limit  soil erosion, and on the 
other hand, incentive measures aiming at encouraging rural households to join 
the PES program. 
Attributes were chosen on the basis of the relevance and technical 
feasibility  of conservation measures they describe, as well as their 
understanding by the local population, following a three-steps process: (i) 
taking up of technical proposals  from development study realized by Daali, 
2003 ; (ii) discussion of attributes, their levels and feasibility of selected 
measures with local technical services of the Ministry of Agriculture (Office 
de la Mise en Valeur Agricole de Ouarzazate) ; and (iii) organization of focus 
groups to discuss the chosen attributes and test local people familiarity with 
them. 
Selected measures comprise (see Table 1): anti-erosive physical works to 
be implemented in collective pastures, intended to slow down water flows 
during flooding events (attribute #1); deferred grazing of collective pastures to 
improve soil vegetation cover to reduce erosion and enhance the quality of 
surface water flowing to the dam (attribute #2) ; and finally planting fruit trees 
on private property lands (attribute #3). 
The two first attributes correspond to collective actions. A marked 
preference for these attributes can be interpreted as an agreement to 
participate to the requested conservation measures together with the other 
community members. They are expected to have a negative effect on utility. 
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Indeed, anti-erosive physical structures require a labour contribution from 
households. Moreover, deferred grazing, by decreasing the availability of 
forage resources, may negatively affect incomes from livestock. 
The third attribute, on the contrary, is related to individual decision upon 
private property lands. The measure consists in planting fruit trees, which is a 
known practice in the region, but currently limited due to the limited size of 
farming properties. The expected effect of this attribute on utility is 
ambiguous: it could be negative if tree planting is perceived as a constraint or 
positive if it is considered as an opportunity of additional income. 
The last two attributes represent two types of incentives: a monetary 
incentive (attribute #4) and an in-kind benefit in the form of technical 
assistance (attribute #5). The interest to associate financial incentive and 
technical assistance has been emphasized by several authors, in particular 
when the contract implies the implementation of complex agricultural 
practices  for which targeted populations do not necessarily have the 
requested capacities (Pagiola et al., 2005) or when the application of 
environmental friendly practices also provide private benefits to farmers 
(Garbach et al., 2012 ;Wynn et al., 2001). The levels chosen for the selected 
attributes are specified in Table 1. 
To conceive the choice sets to be submitted to interviewees, all the possible 
combinations of the levels of all attributes have been generated. The choice 
sets chosen for the experiment comprise two alternatives in addition to the 
status quo (possibility to opt out). The selection of choice sets among all 
possible combinations1 was based on a reduced and orthogonal factorial 
design of 16 alternatives, which have been distributed into two blocks, 
respecting orthogonality within and between blocks2. Each respondent was 
faced with eight different choice sets (Fig. 2 gives an example of choice set). 
                                                     
1Each alternative is described by 5 attributes with 4 levels each, that is to say a full factorial 
plan 45= 4096 alternatives which can be combined into sets of two alternatives in 45*(45-
1)=1.047.552 different ways. 
2Orthogonality is satisfied when the levels of each attribute vary independently from one 
another. 
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Table 1. Selected attributes, definition and levels 
Attributes Definition Levels 
Anti-erosive 
physical 
structures 
Development of sloping collective lands (digging 
half-moon terraces and building of stone dykes in 
the main gullies) 
(in hectares of developed area) 
0 ha 
1000 ha 
3000 ha 
5000 ha 
Deferred 
grazing of 
collective 
pastures 
Banning of grazing on a part of collective 
pastures, to be sown with white wormwood 
(artemisia herba alba),which has a high 
nutritional value for sheep 
(in percentage of the area under collective 
pastures) 
None 
1/4 of the area 
1/3 of the area 
1/2 of the area 
Planting fruit 
trees 
Planting of fruit trees to stabilize soils on 
cultivated lands prone to erosion  within the 
limits of lands in property or recently 
appropriated  
(in number of planted trees) 
10 trees 
20 trees 
50 trees 
100 trees 
Payment Annual payment per household  200 MAD3 
400 MAD 
500 MAD 
600 MAD 
Technical 
assistance  
Technical assistance (7 days/year) to improve 
animal or crop production techniques and 
production system management 
(type of assistance) 
None 
Crop production 
Animal production  
Mixt 
 
3.2 Data collection 
A face-to-face survey was administrated to 144 household heads (5.74% of all 
households) randomly selected among the collective pastures right holders in 
the M’goun catchment. The survey was not limited only to livestock breeders, 
as all right holders, whatever their main activity, have a decision power and 
can choose to use or not the rangelands and to provide the environmental 
services. Two experienced interviewers, speaking the local language, were 
trained in three stages to conduct the survey: (i) an in-door session to explain 
the questionnaire, the survey objective and its mode of administration; (ii) a 
second field session, to test the questionnaire; and (iii) a third, in-door, session 
to correct anomalies observed during the test survey. 
                                                     
3One euro is equivalent to 11,047 MAD (rate of 29/11/2014). 
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Fig. 2. Example of a choice set used in the survey 
 
To avoid a possible “interviewer” bias, each interviewer alternated the 
choice sets blocks from one respondent to another and systematically and 
randomly changed the order of presentation of the choice sets to the 
respondents. 
In addition to the eight choice sets, interviewees were also asked about 
their perception of the present state of the environment in the studied area, as 
well as their activities and their socio-economic and demographic 
characteristics. 
3.3 Model specification 
Choice experiment has its theoretical foundations in Lancaster’s new 
consumer demand theory (Lancaster, 1966) and its econometrical basis in the 
Random Utility Theory (Adamowicz et al., 1998). According to the latter, 
choices aim at maximising the utility or satisfaction associated with the 
subject of choice. An individual i derives a utility ijU  when choosing an 
alternative j within a choice set C. ijU is assumed to depend upon, on one 
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hand, the attribute vector Zj describing the alternative j and, on the other hand, 
the vector of socio-economic characteristics iS specific to the person making 
the choice. This assumes that it is possible to observe the variation of utility 
that an individual associates to the different choices he makes. However, the 
difficulty to define all the individual-specific factors  (psychological, 
sociocultural, historical, etc.) that may have an impact on the choices made, 
leads to assume that utility ijU is composed of an observable part ijV  
describing the variation of preferences in terms of the  alternative attributes, 
and a non-observable part ijε . Thus, it derives that: 
 =  + 
   (1) 
Respondent i chooses alternative h over j if and only if the utility associated 
with h is greater than the utility provided by alternative j ( ih ijU U> ). Thus, 
the probability for an individual i to choose alternative h over j can be written 
as follows: 
Pr ( )ih ih ijP ob U U= > j C∀ ∈ with j h≠  
Pr ( )ih ij ij ihob V V ε ε= − > −   (2) 
Residuals ijε , for every alternative j in the choice set C, are assumed to be 
independently and identically distributed (IID) following an extreme value 
distribution (Gumbel distribution). This assumption corresponds to the 
standard  conditional logit model (McFadden, 1974) for discrete choice 
modelling: 
[ ]exp ( )
exp ( )
ih ih
ih
ij ijj C
V Z
P
V Z
∈
=
  ∑
  (3) 
The indirect utility function Vij for the alternative j is assumed to be a linear 
function of the attributes that can be specified under a vector form as follows:  =  + ∑  .   (4) 
Where 0β  is a Status Quo specific constant, that allows to capture, in an 
aggregate way, the effect of all the variables not considered in the choice 
(Hanley et al., 1998)4. The parameter βk is related to the kth attribute (Zjk) 
describing the chosen alternative j. 
                                                     
4In the case of choice cards with 3 scenarios, when alternatives are  « unlabelled », 
which is the case here, it is recommended to use only one status quo  specific constant 
(Hoyos, 2010 ; Hensher et al., 2005). 
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The willingness to accept (WTA) for a marginal change of a given attribute 
is measured by the ratio of two parameters statistically significant (Hensher et 
al., 2005): the parameter of the given attribute () and the payment 
parameter (). 
 = −    (5) 
WTA confidence interval is estimated using the « Delta » method proposed 
by Hole, 2007. When the parameter of the attribute or of the payment is not 
significant, WTA measure has no sense. 
4 Results 
4.1. Respondents’ characteristics 
Age structure of interviewees is heterogeneous with a slight dominance of 
household heads aged between 41 and 56 years old. Younger household heads 
(less than 40) represent only 21% of the sample. Most respondents are 
illiterate (91%) and only 9% have reached a primary education level. 
Household size varies from 3 to 12 persons with equal proportions of men and 
women. Cropping land area varies from 0.2 ha to 2.4 ha and livestock 
population numbers from 10 to 2000 heads for sheep, with a mean of 183 
heads and from 10 to 1000 heads for goats, with a mean of 114 heads. 
The right-holders’ dominant combination of activities is livestock breeding 
as a main activity, complemented by cropping (47.6% of households). 
Livestock trading is a recent complementary activity, undertaken by 13% of 
interviewees. Only 11% of right-holders are still living only from livestock 
breeding. Interviewees fully converted to crop production are a minority (2%), 
and 5.5% of converted farmers still keep livestock as a complementary 
activity. 
Incomes are generally low5 with little variation among individual 
households, except for few isolated cases (Table 2). 
64% of right-holders have no income outside livestock and cropping. On 
the other hand, 19.3% of right-holders derive additional income from paid 
jobs, trading or other sources, between 5,000 MAD and 15,000 MAD per 
year.  
                                                     
5As a comparison, minimum wage in Morocco (SMIC) is around 2000 MAD/month. 
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Table 2 : Distribution of respondents according to the class of annual income from 
livestock breeding and cropping  
Income classes Livestock breeding Cropping 
frequence % frequence % 
None 2 1.4 25 17.4 
Less than 10,000 MAD/year 28 19.4 90 62.5 
Between 10 et 30,000 MAD/ 
year 87 60.4 25 17.4 
Between 30 and 50,000 
MAD/ year 21 14.6 1 0.7 
Between 50 et 80,000 MAD/ 
year 2 1.4 0 0 
More than 80,000 MAD/ year 4 2.8 3 2 
Total 144 100.0 144 100.0 
 
All the interviewees perceived the degradation of the main natural 
resources of the Imgoun tribe as important. However, the perception of its 
origin differs: for example, 62% of respondents explained that pastures 
degradation is caused by drought and 28.3% by land clearing around the 
villages. 
Water quality is considered as degraded by 22% of interviewees and soils 
are perceived as highly degraded by water erosion by 73% of respondents. 
Only 13% of interviewees think that soil status is normal. 
Almost half of the right-holders (44.13%) think that a financial incentive 
could be a solution to improve natural resources conservation, a little above 
one third have an opposite opinion (36.6%) and finally 18.6% have no 
opinion on the matter. 
Globally, perception of environmental problems and of linkages between 
agro-pastoral ecosystems and water quality is high among the population. The 
link between water quality and physical structure developments is 
acknowledged by a largest part of interviewees than the link between water 
quality and cropping and rangeland management practices. 
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4.2. Empirical model estimation 
The estimated model is a conditional logit which represents the observed 
indirect utility function. The linearity of the latter was tested and the null 
hypothesis of non-linearity was rejected. Estimated results are reported in 
Table 3. 
Utility function estimation is limited to main effects of attributes6. The first 
and third attributes, respectively related to physical structures developments 
on collective pastures and plating fruit trees on private lands are modelled as 
continuous variables, reflecting the variation of utility with a unit change of 
developed area. The second attribute related to deferred grazing is modelled 
as three discrete variables each corresponding to a level of area under deferred 
grazing. The same type of specification was also adopted for the attribute 
describing technical assistance, with three modalities. Finally, the payment 
attribute was modelled as a continuous variable (to limit scale effects, values 
used in the model correspond to one hundredth of those used in the 
experiment). The estimated model is thus composed of nine variables in 
addition to the Status Quo specific constant (ASC). 
The model is globally significant (p<0,001). The overall quality of the 
model measured by  the McFadden’s pseudo R2 of 0.35, is good by 
conventional standards (Ben-Akiva and Lehrman, 1985). Moreover, results 
reveal that all variables have a very significant effect, except the two 
parameters that represent the two extreme modalities of the deferred grazing 
attribute. Model coefficients cannot be directly interpreted in terms of 
importance of these effects on the probability of acceptance of PES 
alternatives. One then uses Odds Ratios7, which allows capturing the effect of 
each variable on the probability of choosing the observed alternatives. 
Status Quo was chosen in only 1.04% of choice situations and only 15.28% 
of respondents chose Status Quo systematically. The negative sign of the ASC 
indicates the interviewees’ preference for the implementation of a PES 
program. The Status Quo situation thus decreases right-holders’ satisfaction 
and reduces the choice probability by 58.4% (Exp(β)=0.416) relatively to the 
implementation of a PES program. 
Physical structures development on collective rangelands have, contrary to 
expectations, a positive effect on individuals’ utility and increases the 
probability of joining a PES by 8.4% (Exp(β) = 1.084). This can be explained, 
on one hand by a low opportunity cost of family labour or by the important 
                                                     
6A number of models with interactions between the attributes and individual characteristics of 
respondents have been estimated but none of these interactions proved to be statistically 
significant. 
7Some authors called them « ratios of relative risk ». They correspond to the ratios of relative 
choice and no choice probabilities. 
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household size, which represents a stock of manpower, often under used8, 
and, on the other hand, by the interest of these developments to protect crops 
located along the M’goun valley against floods during high flow periods. 
Thus participation to these collective developments is positively perceived by 
interviewed households. 
The attribute related to fruit tree planting on private lands has, as expected, 
a positive effect on utility and increases the probability of joining the PES 
program by 53%. This can be explained by the additional income provided by 
selling fruits in the midterm. The hypothesis of a negative effect of planting 
linked to the land constraint (small cropping areas) is therefore rejected. In 
fact, cropping intensification on limited areas is a practice largely adopted by 
Imgoun people. Moreover, the maximum density of trees proposed in the 
experiment allows for intercropping with the crops currently grown by 
farmers. 
Table 3 : Estimation results of the conditional logit model 
Types of attributes Attribute β, significance(1)  
(standard-deviation) 
Odds ratios 
(Exp(β)) 
Constant ASC -0.883*** (0.293) 0,416 
Collective measure Physical structures 0.081*** (0.031) 1,084 
Collective measure Deferred grazing   
1/4 of pastures 0.079NS (0.142) 1,082 
1/3 of pastures -0.395**  (0.171) 0,674 
1/2 of pastures -0.252 NS (0.192) 0,778 
Individual measure  Planting on private lands 0.426***  (0.131) 1,53 
Monetary incentive Payment 0.117***  (0.036) 1,124 
In-kind incentive Cropping technical assistance :  0.882***  (0.14) 2,416 
Livestock technical assistance  1.89***  (0.2) 6,616 
Mixed technical assistance  1.712*** (0.143) 5,542 
Model statistics:   
Log-Likelihood -817.041  
Pseudo R2 0,35  
Prob> chi2 0.0000  
LR chi2(10) 897,12  
% of correctly predicted answers 67,25  
Number of  observations 3456  
(1)
 significant at 1% (***), 5% (**) levels, not significant (NS) 
 
  
                                                     
8Discussions with livestock breeders revealed that some of them even think to specifically 
contract workers to replace them in the implementation of this collective commitment. 
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Deferred grazing attribute coefficients indicate that its effect on individual 
satisfaction depends on the area. Conservation of less than a quarter or more 
than half, of the accessible pastures has no effect on choices. For an 
intermediary area of one third of collective rangelands, deferred grazing 
significantly decreases individuals’ satisfaction, as expected, because of its 
negative effect on forage availability. 
Technical assistance has, as expected, a highly significant positive effect on 
PES choice. Whatever its form (for crop production, animal production or 
both), it largely improves individuals’ utility and would encourage them to 
join the PES program. However, the interest of the assistance varies with its 
object: the positive effect decreases from livestock oriented assistance to 
mixed assistance, and then to crop-oriented assistance (increase in choice 
probability is respectively 562%, 454% and 142%). Relative preferences 
between the three modalities of assistance reflect the hierarchy of income 
sources observed in the region. Indeed, despite a recent trend in land 
appropriation to develop cropping, livestock breeding remains the most 
important source of livelihoods, and improving its performances is highly 
desired by the population. One can also assume that respondents hope to 
improve production performances of their herds with technical assistance, 
thus compensating the decrease in collective pastures area associated with 
deferred grazing. 
Financial incentive has, as expected, a significant positive effect on utility 
and on PSE adherence. However, this effect is markedly lower than effect of 
technical assistance effect (it only increases the probability of choice by 
12.35%). 
4.3. Willingness to accept 
Willingness to accept (WTA) can be estimated only for the second level of 
deferred grazing, as the coefficients are not significant for the other two 
levels. Thus, WTA amounts to 338.9 MAD (with a large confidence interval 
at 5% from 81.3 MAD to 596.5 MAD) for deferred grazing on one third of 
collective pastures (i.e. an area of 15,430 ha). This marginal value, if reported 
to the total area of rangelands under conservation, corresponds to a mean 
payment of 55 MAD per hectare under conservation, which is largely less 
than the compensation payment currently applied in Morocco for deferred 
grazing in forests (250 MAD per hectare9). 
                                                     
9
 Decree N° 2-99-626 of 30th of June 1999 and its implementation text available from 2002, 
ruling deferred grazing in the forestry domain. 
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5. Discussion 
Choice experiment conducted at the design stage of policy making can inform 
on the respective effects of PES attributes on the probability for the targeted 
population to join the program. This allows informing public decision-makers 
both on the characteristics of the contract likely to induce efficient 
conservation and on the necessary adaptations to the local context to 
maximize the acceptance of the proposed conservation measures. 
The research results show that expected effects are not always confirmed. 
Some unexpected impacts of an attribute or an attribute level can be specified 
with the experiment, which enables a wiser choice of conservation measures. 
In particular, the methodological choice of combining individual 
commitments on private lands with the participation to a collective action on 
common pastures to preserve soil and water resources,  opens new 
perspectives for the implementation of PES in the case of collective 
rangelands. The design possibilities and lessons learnt in the case of Morocco 
and more globally for the application of PES in common-pool resources 
contexts are discussed in the following sections. 
5.1 Choosing practical modalities for conditionality and incentive  
5.1.1 Impact of conservation measures on fostering new collective action   
The results of our experiment indicate that voluntary participation to the 
two collective measures of physical anti-erosive structures and deferred 
grazing of common pastures is not systematically rejected, which may reflect 
a particular position of right-holders towards intra-community cooperation. 
However, model results show that engagement in collective action varies, at 
individual scale, along with its object, according to the nature of requested 
effort and implied direct and opportunity costs. Thus, in the case of physical 
structures where the requested effort takes the form of labour, the effect on 
PES adoption is positive, whereas, in the case of deferred grazing, the effect is 
significantly negative for only one level (one third of common pastures area). 
On the other hand, responses to the questionnaire do not give a satisfying 
explanation to the non-significant effect of the other two levels of deferred 
grazing. Further investigations would be necessary to understand the right-
holders’ motivations. 
Despite some necessary clarification, CE results indicate that respondents’ 
behaviour is not fundamentally different in a common property regime that it 
would be in a private property context: reject or acceptance of measures is 
largely dependent on individual costs and benefits of proposed measures. 
However, in the case of the collective property under study, it appears that 
additional utility provided by the realization of collective anti-erosive 
structures could be explained by sociocultural or psychosocial factors 
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arousing the will to reinforce traditional cooperation mechanisms, which have 
decreased over the past decades (Bourbouze, 1999). Respondents do not 
hesitate to express their nostalgia for these traditions, illustrated by the 
persistence, up to now, of Agdals10, an efficient system of pastoral 
management (Dominguez et al., 2012 ; Ilahiane, 1999). 
However that may be, the validation of these hypotheses requires further 
investigations to explore the detailed motivations of these preferences. 
5.1.2 Superiority of technical assistance over financial incentive 
Results suggest that, in all likelihood, PES implementation in the M’goun 
context cannot only rely on payments to improve hydrological regulation and 
rangeland conservation. In a context where technical advice is not much 
accessible, technical assistance, be it targeted on crop production or animal 
production, provides a much stronger incentive to subscribe to a PES, so 
much that it is the most decisive attribute of choices. Tesfaye and Brouwer, 
2012, also demonstrated the positive effect of technical assistance on PES 
acceptance for similar livestock production systems in Ethiopia, although, in 
their case, securing land rights had a more important incentive power than 
technical assistance. Livestock oriented technical assistance would allow 
compensating partly the reduction of available forage by improving livestock 
genetic performances, animal health and herd management. Livestock owners 
are conscious of this loss of earnings, and have thus expressed in the choice 
experiment a high information and supervision need to enhance their 
production. To a lesser extent, agricultural technical assistance is also more 
appreciated than direct payments. This can be explained by a need for 
technical advice to mitigate impacts of droughts and improve the productivity 
of crops recently introduced in the region such as fruit growing The recent 
settlement of the population increases the need for improving production 
techniques and know-how, all the more since the small size of landholdings 
and the limited possibilities of extension incite farmers to intensify their 
productions. 
5.1.3 Incentive and collective action 
In accordance with theoretical predictions, the financial incentive increases 
the propensity of individuals to contract a PES. However, its low incidence 
suggests that it would not be sufficient, in itself, to trigger PES subscription of 
most right-holders in the community. In a collective property context, if only 
a minority of individuals subscribe to PES, the additional advantage in terms 
of environmental services is very likely to be reduced or even cancelled out 
                                                     
10
 Les Agdals sont des espaces pastoraux soumis à une mise en défens volontaire traditionnelle 
et très ancienne chez les populations Amazigh du Haut et du Moyen Atlas marocains. 
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by congestion externalities (for example, right-holders who do not currently 
use the rangelands could be encouraged to do so in order , either to benefit 
from the PES or to claim their right in fear that PES implementation might 
exclude them) or technological externalities (dues to differences of 
technological packages used to exploit resources) that non-contractors may 
exert in this type of context (Agrawal, 2001; Ostrom et al., 1994). This could 
be particularly influential when payments are provided by private 
beneficiaries located downstream. In such a situation, while payments, as they 
were defined in the experiment, are based on committed means and not on 
results, the difficulty to produce visible and satisfying outcomes in terms of 
environmental services provision might deter beneficiaries to pay. 
Furthermore, even if the PES program was state-funded, it would not be 
efficient. This suggests that PES instrument efficiency relies on the 
maximization of subscription, which is also a necessary condition for 
collective action. 
Several works in behavioural economics and social psychology have 
emphasized the risk for individual monetary incentives of crowding out 
individuals’ intrinsic (or non-economic) motivations for collective action 
(Bowles and Polanía-Reyes, 2012 ; Vatn, 2009). In our case study, this risk 
can probably be discarded because monetary incentive was not the main 
incentive chosen by rural households, and the traditions of collective action 
appeared to be sufficiently rooted in behaviours such that including anti-
erosive works in the PES would have a positive effect on its subscription. 
However, this issue would certainly deserve further consideration.  
5.2 Lessons for PES implementation on collective lands  
5.2.1 Lessons for conservation policies in Morocco 
In Morocco, the use of PES for watershed protection represents an 
important opportunity for enhancing the funding and efficiency of 
conservation of the 51 million hectares of collective rangelands located in the 
major catchments of the country (El Mokaddem et al., 2014). Several lessons 
can be drawn from the results obtained in the M’goun catchment for designing 
conservation policies in Morocco. 
First, right-holders have expressed a marked interest for PES targeted to 
rangelands. However, results related to the level of deferred grazing 
demonstrate the interest of a prior assessment of people preferences. To 
ensure PES program efficiency, proposed conservation measures cannot be 
arbitrarily defined on the basis of intuition or purely technical choices. For 
example, the principle to limit deferred grazing to one fifth of the forested 
rangelands, presently in force in Morocco, could be revised by investing in the 
understanding of local population preferences. 
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Second, monetary compensation, presently under study in Morocco, would 
not be sufficient. Technique assistance to improve production performances, 
both in animal and crop productions would probably be a more effective 
alternative to encourage deferred grazing. It has the advantage to be strongly 
desired by the population and offers prospects of multiplier effect on local 
economy in the midterm. It therefore seems better to invest in strengthening 
information level through technical assistance instead of increasing financial 
compensation for deferred grazing. Such a measure would be in line with the 
present strategy of the Ministry of Agriculture to implement an agricultural 
extension service at local level through an institutional reform, translated  into 
regional action plans (Dugué et al., 2014). Nonetheless, coordination between 
the various administrations in charge of agriculture, extension service, water, 
forest and environment management would be necessary to ensure effective 
rangelands and watershed conservation. 
The third lesson is related to the possibility to support collective action 
within common property rangelands. The experiment reported in this paper 
suggests that PES are likely to meet this challenge. Collective action can 
occur when proposed conservation measures get support from local 
community. In order to achieve this, compensation of opportunity costs of 
proposed measures can be combined with the joint benefits right-holders 
derive from conservation options. Choice experiment allows for anticipating 
local people’s reactions and adjusting the PES design such that proposed 
incentives are harmonized with proposed conservation measures. Financial 
compensation might be useless for some measures because of their very low 
opportunity cost (for example some types of anti-erosive physical structures) 
or because of their high desirability, which contributes to lessen the costs of 
conservation for public decision-makers. 
Finally, the M’goun study case provides original and valuable perspectives 
given the scarcity of researches addressing PES application to collective 
resources. The similarities of this catchment with most of the semi-arid 
rangelands in Morocco open the floor for an implementation of such 
instruments in other regions in the country, and beyond to other countries with 
similar situations in Maghreb. 
5.2.2 Lessons for the implementation of PES in common property settings 
In the case of PES targeting collective subscription from the community, 
one can observe a posteriori a gap between preferences of the community 
representatives, who had decided to subscribe, and those of individuals who 
are supposed to implement conservation options (Kerr et al., 2014). This gap 
is described in the literature as likely to alter cooperation in a common-pool 
resources context (Bornstein, 2003; Willer, 2009). Asking individuals about 
their preferences regarding conservation measures, prior to PES 
implementation can help preventing these gaps. Experience of compensation 
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of collective deferred grazing in Morocco has demonstrated that collective 
compensation through tribal or community institutions leads to an equal 
distribution of incentives, independent of real effort, which is highly contested 
by resources users who stand up against a lack of fairness (El Mokaddem et 
al., 2014). On contrary, a PES program targeting individual right-holders 
would allow directing payments to households really committed to 
conservation, instead of generalizing it to all community members. This is 
particularly important in the case of deferred grazing as selective targeting 
reduces the inefficiency associated with the absence of distinction between 
right-holders who do not use their right and real rangeland users (El Alaoui, 
2002). 
Furthermore, the association of individual and collective conservation 
measures in the same contract, under the condition of a minimum engagement 
in the individual measure, would possibly reduce the risk of free-riding on 
collective action (Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010). This method of right-
holders selection has not been tested yet for collective rangeland management 
and needs to be studied further, especially when collective action requires the 
acceptance of all right-holders, as in the case of deferred grazing. 
6. Conclusion 
The main objective of this paper was to analyse the possibility and the 
conditions of implementation of a PES scheme targeting individual users of 
collective rangelands for soil and water resources conservation, in a watershed 
located in the South of Morocco. In particular, the research aimed at 
identifying which conservation and incentive measures were the most likely to 
get support from the rural population concerned. To achieve this, a choice 
experiment was conducted with a sample of rural households holding rights 
on collective rangelands in the upstream part of the M’goun catchment.  
Results of the conditional logit model estimated from the survey provide 
new perspectives on household preferences in terms of conservation measures 
(conditionality) and incentives. In particular, they brought to light the 
possibility to combine in the same contract collective measures (physical 
structures or deferred grazing) and individual measures (tree planting on 
private lands). Including collective physical structures or fruit tree planting in 
the PES scheme would have a positive impact on household acceptance of the 
contract. At the opposite, imposing deferred grazing on collective rangelands, 
beyond what is traditionally practiced by the community, would require a 
financial compensation. The determination of the most appropriate level for 
deferred grazing requires, however, further investigations, because of the non-
significance of the most extreme modalities proposed in this experiment. 
Regarding incentives, the analysis confirmed the high importance awarded to 
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technical assistance by rural households, who value it even more than 
financial compensation, in a context of difficult access to technical 
information. Econometric analysis showed no evidence of major preference 
heterogeneity within the studied population, but the validity of this result in 
other regions of Morocco, or more generally in Maghreb, needs to be 
confirmed. 
Finally, this research contributes to enrich the yet limited literature on the 
application of PES to common-pool natural resources, especially to collective 
rangelands. By identifying unexpected effects of some attributes on the 
acceptance of this incentive instrument in complex contexts such as collective 
rangelands, the choice experiment approach provides valuable insights for 
designing policies to protect these vulnerable ecosystems, spreading over 
large areas. Given the limited number of attributes that can be incorporated in 
choice experiment, there is first, a need for further research to specify the 
most appropriate modalities of this type of instruments in this context 
(monetary or non-monetary incentive, collective or individual payment, 
institutional arrangements), and second, for discussing the research results 
with interviewed households to improve their interpretation. 
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